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In this paper, we highlight how inter-ﬁrm collaboration networks are inﬂuenced by the
knowledge composition of goods in an industry. For this purpose, we carry out an agent
based simulation study in which ﬁrms integrate their competencies under diﬀerent knowledge
base regimes. In this way networks form. The results reveal that, knowledge regime signif-
icantly inﬂuences the network structure, and interaction among ﬁr m si sv e r yi n t e n s i v ew h e n
the products are specialized but also have common knowledge among them.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent decades, the intensity of horizontal and vertical relations among ﬁrms has increased to
a large extent, especially in the case of knowledge intensive industries. The rapid innovations
and increasing product complexity in these industries have not only raised the requirements for
compatibility among product components, but have also been accompanied by richer technological
opportunities. These developments prepared the grounds for intensive relations among ﬁrms, in the
face of diﬃculties faced by a single ﬁrm to be self suﬃcient in serving a rapidly changing market.
Mostly, interdependencies among products, compatibility requirements, specialization and collab-
oration accompany each other in these systems. Task complexity, combined with time pressure,
makes coordination among ﬁrms more eﬃcient than vertical hierarchies [1,2].
∗I thank Robin Cowan for many helpful suggestions.
1In such an environment, knowledge has become a central factor in inﬂuencing industry dynam-
ics. In most industries, ﬁrms need to pursue strategies that favour external relations, not only
in subcontracting components but also to share knowledge and make use of knowledge spillovers.
A major process that accompanies the inter-ﬁrm relations is the signiﬁcant knowledge ﬂow that
takes place between the ﬁrms, which is usually considered to be an important engine for innova-
tion. These knowledge spillovers are not only caused by formalized arrangements between ﬁrms,
but may also be the result of informal communications, a concept which Allen [3] termed to be
collective invention (see also [4]). The structure of networks among ﬁrms is inevitably inﬂuenced
by the competencies needed in production and the architecture of these networks yield insights into
eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency with which knowledge is transferred, created and also the innovative
performance of ﬁrms [5,7] .
There is a rich literature that addresses in a broad sense the relation between knowledge speciﬁc
characteristics and networks. Among these, studies that focus on uncertainty and industry events
[8,10]; complementarities in goods [11], similarities in knowledge bases [12,13] the stage in the
industry life cycle [14]; interdependence in products [15], system embeddedness and observability
of knowledge [16]; hierarchical organization of knowledge base [17], characteristics of knowledge in
terms of technological opportunities and tacitness [18] can be cited.
The question addressed in this paper is how the network structure responds to diﬀerent knowl-
edge base regimes. The approach that is used diﬀers from previous studies in that a dynamic
network approach is adopted Speciﬁcally, in the agent based simulation model, self interested ac-
tors who have competencies in diﬀerent areas chose partners to integrate their knowledge and
produce. Actors also learn from each other in this process, and networks form by the interactions
among them. We analyse these networks and highlight the relation between patterns of interaction
and knowledge base of the industry. We model the knowledge base using the concept of related-
ness among products (similarity in their knowledge requirements) and the level of specialization of
products. The results reveal that, interaction among actors is very intensive when the products are
specialized but also have common knowledge among them.
The paper is organized as follows. In the ﬁrst section, we explain the main model and present
some preliminary analytical results. In the second section we present an agent based simulation
study where self interested economic actors form networks to integrate their knowledge. We analyse
the structure of resulting networks under diﬀerent regimes of the knowledge base in the third section.
Some discussions and concluding remarks follow in the last section.
22T h e M o d e l
2.1 General
Let us consider a simple economy in which there are two producers, two goods and two knowledge
types. Each of the goods require both types of knowledge in their production, though the intensity
of use can be diﬀerent. Speciﬁcally, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for each good,
with two knowledge inputs and where γmj measures the extent to which good m is knowledge j
intensive (we assume constant returns to scale, so that γm1+γm2 =1for each good). To formalize,
denote knowledge input by k,w h e r ekij shows producer i0s knowledge endowment in area j.I t












where α is a production parameter. We assume that there are no competing uses for the knowledge,
so that its opportunity cost is zero, and producers use all their knowledge in production. We also
assume that demand is perfectly elastic so that proﬁts increase monotonically with quantity. We
take relative prices to be unity.
We assume that each of the producers is knowledgeable in both types, but is specialized in
only one of them (i.e. knows one type of knowledge more than the other). Let us assume that
producer 1 is expert in knowledge type 1, and producer 2 is expert in knowledge type 2,s ot h a t
k11 >k 12 and k22 >k 21. Single production means that a producer performs the production activity
by him/herself alone, utilizing his/her own knowledge in both types. Accordingly, if production
is to be maximised, he/she will produce that good which uses his expertise area more intensively.
We assume that good 1 is knowledge 1 intensive, and good 2 is knowledge 2 intensive, so that
γ11 >γ 12 and γ22 >γ 21 (Since we assume constant returns to scale, this implies that γ11 > 1/2
and γ22 > 1/2). Then, it is straightforward to show that in the single case, producer 1 produces
good 1, and producer 2 produces good 2. 1
2.2 Knowledge Integration
Single production is only one of the options that the producer can chose. Otherwise, output can
further be increased if both producers integrate their knowledge, produce both goods together
and share the ﬁnal output. In making this choice, we assume that the producer simply makes a
comparison between the two cases (single or joint), and selects the one that yields more output for
him. For pairwise production to be realized, both producers simultaneously should ﬁnd it beneﬁcial
3to collaborate. The rule for knowledge integration is as follows: the amount of joint knowledge that
enters the production function is maximum of what each agent knows in type j and is given by; 2
k
pair




j) ∀j =1 ....K (2)
Since there are two knowledge types (K=2), for eﬀective knowledge integration to occur it should
b et h ec a s et h a tk11 >k 21 and k22 >k 12 (which states that no agent has absolute superiority in
both knowledge types). When producers integrate their knowledge, the amount of knowledge that
enters the joint production function is given by
Knowledge1 :m a x ( k11,k 21)=k11
Knowledge 2 :m a x ( k12,k 22)=k22
Let us ﬁrst take the case of producer 1. He/she has to decide between producing good 1 alone
(Eq. 1), or to produce both goods with producer 2 and get half of total production so that his/her







for n,m =1 ,2 (goods). The question that we address is, for which parameter values and initial
knowledge levels will the agents simultaneously prefer to produce together rather than alone?
Proposition 1 In the initial period, two producers will form pairs if and only if the following
conditions are satisﬁed simultaneously;


























for γ11 + γ22 > 1.
Proof. See Appendix
Inequalities 4 and 5 imply that the more is the knowledge of the other producer, the more likely
will the producer himself be willing to collaborate. Below, we elaborate further on Proposition 1,
in relation to Figure 1.4
To make things mathematically tractable, let us assume that k12 = k21 =1 . Let us also assume
symmetrical weights for the two products. That is to say that, γ11 = γ22 and which also implies
4γ12 = γ21. As noted above, γ11 measures the extent of knowledge intensiveness of the products in
their respective expert types.
Figure 1: Collaboration conditions for same major knowledge levels
The shaded areas in Figures 1 (a) and 1 (b) show the areas in which collaboration will take
place as a function of the major knowledge levels. Figure 1 is based on inequalities 4 and 5. The
intersection point of the curves is the level of minor knowledge type, which is equal to 1 in (a) and
(b). Whether collaboration takes place or not depends on the major and minor knowledge levels
of producers and the production parameters. Collaboration can only take place when the major
knowledge levels are higher than the minor knowledge levels (that is, major knowledge levels should
be greater than 1 in Figure 1). If the initial major knowledge levels are the same (which corresponds
to a 45◦ line in Figure 1), collaboration will take place on the part of the 45◦ line greater than 1.
Collaboration does not take place in two cases. First when major knowledge types are smaller
than minor levels, and second, when the diﬀerence between the major knowledge levels among the
two producers is very high. This means that expertise level of one producer is too little compared
5to the other producer. So only within a certain limits of major knowledge levels will collaboration
take place, and these limits narrow down as γ11 increases (In Figure 1 (a) the γ11 = γ22 =0 .9 and
the area of collaboration is smaller than Figure 1 (b) where γ11 = γ22 =0 .6).
Intuitively, this is because higher γ11 implies lower γ12, which means that the intensity of
the minor knowledge type gets lower. But this means that, the contribution of the partner is
lower, which is in the minor category. Therefore the partner should be high enough an expert to
compensate for the lower weight of the minor category. Consequently, as γ11 increases, the area of
collaboration falls as shown in Figure 1 (a) in comparison to Figure 1 (b).
To summarize, the likelihood of single production increases as a) γ11,γ22 increases and b) when
either partners knowledge level is too low compared to the partner him/herself, since then the higher
knowing producer will not be willing to participate. The higher are these production parameters,
the less diﬀerence among competencies is permitted for collaboration to take place (see Figure 1
(a)).
Corollary 2 The more specialized are the products, the closer the producers should be in their
respective expertise ﬁelds for collaboration to take place initially. Similarly, the less specialized are
the products, collaboration can take place even if the expertise levels are relatively diﬀerent, i.e.
there is a higher diﬀerence between their knowledge levels in their respective major categories.
However, the above analysis is only conﬁned to the ﬁrst period. As productive activities continue
learning takes place, and knowledge levels are updated. In the sections below, we incorporate
learning eﬀects.
2.3 Learning
In the previous section, we analysed the conditions under which collaboration occurs in the initial
period. In this section, we analyse the behaviour of the system in the second period, as agents gain
experience in the production process and accumulate knowledge. We assume that learning takes
place in both types of knowledge. It is learning by doing, and the amount learned depends upon
the amount produced. Therefore, the extent that producer i learns depend on the level of producer
j0s knowledge as well in the case of joint production. In each period, we assume agents re-consider
their decision about collaborating, based on the new knowledge levels. The learning function by
which knowledge levels are updated is as follows, given for producer i in knowledge type s.We also
include an uncertainty term in this learning process, as the details are given in the Equation 6.
kis(t)=kis(t − 1) + θiy(t)g(t) (6)





where θi measures the combinative capability of the agent, and δi(t) is an uncertainty eﬀect. Eq.
(6) implies that learning is measured by how much the agent can make use of production y(t) (given
by 3). This is ﬁrstly a function of capability of the agent and relative knowledge levels between the
partners.
Firstly, if agent i knows less than his/her partner, the amount of his learning is limited by their
relative knowledge levels and his/her capabilities. For example, if his learning capability is too
high relative to partner, he can even leapfrog the partner. Secondly, if agent i knows more than
his/her partner (agent j) before production, there is only an uncertainty in his ability to make use
of production and increase his knowledge. This is because now there is no other partner from whom
he can learn from, since he is already the expert. This is given in the ﬁrst part of the function g(t).
In this case, this can be considered as R&D. Here, uncertainty is given by the parameter δi(t) which
is diﬀerent for all agents in each period. The knowledge types are updated in all the knowledge
types that enter the production function of goods produced by the pair or the agent him/herself.
At this point, one question of interest is, will there be collaboration in the second period once
there is a collaboration in the ﬁrst period? In other words, what maintains the continuity of
collaborations? For clariﬁcation, we denote period 0 by t − 1 and period 1 by t.
The possibilities for collaboration in the second period is given by the following conditions.
For analytical tractability we assume that the learning capabilities of producers are the same and
δi(t)=1 .
Proposition 3 If capability levels are the same among producers, and if there was collaboration in
the ﬁrst period, collaboration will continue in the second period if and only if the following conditions
are met for producers 1 and 2,
F o rP r o d u c e r1
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Proposition 3 is interpreted as follows. Since we assume there is collaboration in the ﬁrst period,
the conditions given by 4 and 5 are already satisﬁed. The new condition imposed by Proposition
is shown by Figure 2 below which is the same as Figure 1 plus the new constraints shown by dark
grey areas.
Figure 2 is based on the Equations 7 and 8, where the horizontal and vertical axis are the ﬁrst
period major knowledge levels. Since there was collaboration in the ﬁrst period by assumption,
we are in any point inside the light grey area (this area is the same as Figure 1). The second
period constraints are revealed by the addition of the dark grey area. Therefore, for collaboration
to continue in the second period, the ﬁrst period major knowledge levels should be somewhere in
8the total shaded area. If in the ﬁrst period there was collaboration, this means that collaboration
will continue in any case in the second period too, since the light grey area is covered by the total
shaded area (light grey and dark grey).
In this section, we presented some analytical results of the model, taking an economy with
two producers, two knowledge types and two products. The results highlight the critical role of
complementarities in production. Producers will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to form a collaboration only when
they will get higher production by integrating their knowledge is the basic premise of our model.
We investigated the role of parameters in inﬂuencing the producers willingness to collaborate in
subsequent periods.
Although this model gives a basic idea on the logic of knowledge integration and production, the
real world case is far more complicated than what this simple model reveals. When there are more
than 2 producers in the economy, the dynamics are inevitably more complicated, since the choice
set of the agent is proportional to the number of other producers, whether to produce singly or
considering all the other producers to collaborate. Moreover, once a collaboration occurs between
two agents at a certain period, in the next period, the agents might collaborate with others, and
collaborate with each other again in the following period. Also in this section we took into account
the deterministic case. In real world the extent of learning is highly uncertain. When such situations
are taken into account, the dynamics of knowledge and dynamics of interaction is too complex to
handle with analytical tools. Therefore, we perform an agent based simulation study,
3 Simulations
3.1 General
In this section we extend the analysis to incorporate a larger number of producers, goods and
knowledge types, and we carry out a simulation analysis on the resulting interaction patterns
among agents.
There are 5 goods, 5 knowledge types, and 50 agents in the economy. Each agent i is endowed
with a knowledge vector, ki assigned randomly (drawn from a uniform distribution) at period t =0 ;
kij shows the level of agent i’s knowledge in type j. There exist a knowledge type j for all i such
that kij >k im ∀m 6= j .5 Given his/her knowledge vector, each agent in each period produces a
good. But an agent can produce singly, or integrate his/her knowledge with another agent and
produce together. If an agent i produces singly, the probability that he/she will produce good n
is proportional to the weight of his expertise type j required by the good.6 We adopt the term
n − type agent if the agent produces good n. The amount that he/she produces singly is given by
9yi
n as given by Eq. 1.
Each agent, in each period t, selects between producing as single or producing in a pair with
another agent. In making this decision, the agent’s criteria is to maximise his/her output. Therefore,
he makes a comparison between his/her joint output with all other agents in the economy and
what he/she will produce alone. Joint production happens through integration of knowledge of
the two agents. When an n − type agent and a m − type agent form a pair, we assume they
produce both goods n and m. It is assumed that if two agents i and l collaborate (n − type and
m − type respectively), their joint knowledge in category j is given by Eq. 2 which enters the
production function of both goods according to Eq. 1 and shared among them according to Eq. 3.
Therefore, agent i compares his/her single output yi
n with ypair
n,m with all other agents. Here, it is
assumed that agents know the knowledge levels of the other agents. Every agent has a preference
listing (other agents ranked according to the maximum output they can produce with him/her).
In practice, pairing in the population is made in such a way that no two agents prefer each other
to their current partners. As diﬀerent from the marriage problem, where there are two diﬀerent
populations, this is termed to be the room-mate problem, where pairs are formed within a single
population [19]. Within a similar framework as this paper, Cowan et. al [20] utilize this matching
algorithm for analysing the network dynamics resulting from joint innovation by interaction and
knowledge integration of agents. After production, learning takes place according to Eq. 6, pairs
dissolve and next period expertise areas are updated, and new pairs form.
One of the values that we are interested is the relatedness among two goods. The production
parameters can be used to derive a measure of relatedness. We assume that, the more similar is the
knowledge requirements of two goods, the more related they are. We measure relatedness among
two goods by the cosine of the angle between them. More speciﬁcally, the cosine index between two










Obviously, cosnn =1 , and if there is no common knowledge between the goods, cosmn =0 . Other
cases fall in between the two extremes. Therefore, high cosine values indicate increased relatedness
between two products, in terms of similarity in their knowledge requirements. The relatedness
between the goods is represented by the symmetric matrix COS(M × M),w h e r ecosij gives the
cosine between products i and j.
The model consists of a setting in which all goods have an equal number of knowledge inputs
but with diﬀerent intensities in each separate simulation. We aim to highlight how the resulting
10k1 k3 k2 k4
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Figure 3: A Schematic Representation of Knowledge and Products
Table 1: Representation of the Matrix of Input Coeﬃcients
k1 k2 k3 k4 k5
p1 γ1 γ3 00 γ2
p2 γ2 γ1 γ3 00
p3 0 γ2 γ1 γ3 0
p4 00 γ2 γ1 γ3
p5 γ3 00 γ2 γ1
interaction patterns are inﬂuenced when goods use one knowledge intensively, or when they have a
more distributed knowledge base with equal shares of all goods.
3.2 Modelling the Knowledge Base
It is possible to demonstrate the knowledge base of goods by a simple network, as Figure 3 demon-
strates.
Figure 3 shows that each of the goods (shown by p) require three consecutive knowledge types,
one of which, shown by the bold arrow is used more intensively. In this way, two consecutive goods
have two knowledge types in common, but what is a major input in one is only minor in the other.
The relative weights of these knowledge types is the production parameters of the good. As a
demonstration, the production parameters corresponding to this scheme is given by Table 1 where
the rows and columns represent goods and knowledge types respectively, and γij gives the weight
of knowledge j in good i.7
Since we assume constant returns to scale, the row sums are one (i.e. γ1 + γ2 + γ3 =1 ) . Also
there is one knowledge type that is more intensively used than the others, γ1 >γ 2 and γ1 >γ 3.
The gamma values in diﬀerent simulations range between two extreme cases: on one hand, we take
the case where the goods are totally distinct from each other, where they share no knowledge in
common. This corresponds to the case where,
11Table 2: The Case of No Relatedness in Goods, Cosine Matrix






Table 3: Maximum Relatedness among Goods, Cosine Matrix
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
p1 12 /31 /31 /32 /3
p2 2/312 /31 /31 /3
p3 1/32 /312 /31 /3
p4 1/31 /32 /312 /3
p5 2/31 /31 /32 /31
γ1 =1 (10)
γ2 = γ3 =0
Corresponding to this case, the COS matrix is given by Table 2.
In the other extreme, we take the case where relatedness is maximum among the products.
Therefore,
γ1 = γ2 = γ3 =1 /3 (11)
The corresponding COS matrix is given by Table 3.
This speciﬁcation implies that, relatedness between two consecutive goods, i and i+1is higher
than the relatedness between i and i+2.8 The main parameter that is varied in diﬀerent simulations
is the production parameters that are inputs in the production function (given by Eq. 1 and Table
1). From the production parameters, we derive measures of relatedness using Eq. 9 computed by
the average of the elements of the COS matrix. In this speciﬁcation, it is easy to see that as the
weight of the major knowledge type falls, the relatedness between two consecutive goods increase
and this is when the goods utilize a more distributed set of knowledge inputs. On the other hand
increased dominance of the major knowledge type implies that goods are less related, and we call
these goods specialized goods.
12We carry out 40 simulation runs. In each of these runs, a diﬀerent set of input coeﬃcients are
used for the 5 goods. On one extreme, we have the case given by Eq. 10 and on the other extreme
we have the case given by Eq. 11. In between cases consist of parameters which yield intermediate
levels of relatedness among the products. We present the results with respect to the relatedness
measures, which are derived by taking the average of the cosine matrices that correspond to each
set of input coeﬃcients in diﬀerent runs.9
In each of the runs there are 10,000 periods. In each period, matching takes place, pairs form
and produce according to Eq. 1 and agents update their knowledge according to Eq. 6. In each
period who forms a pair with who is recorded as an adjacency matrix. We take into account only
bilateral link formation in a single period, but when suﬃcient time periods elapse, these bilateral
links form a network, and a certain network structure emerges. We consider the results when the
network stops changing, i.e. when the stability in the network is achieved. The results are based on
the frequency matrices of the last 500 ± 10 periods. The uncertainty parameter δk(t) ∈ [0.95,1.05]
and capabilities are θk ∈ [0.8,1.2].10
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Network Density







where xij =1if there is an edge between i and j and 0 otherwise and N is the total number of
nodes.12 The denominator measures total number of available links in the network, and numerator
measures the number of existing links.
Figure 4 depicts two results. Firstly, there is a clear negative relationship between relatedness
and network density. As the relatedness among the products increase, the density of the network
falls (lowest density occurring for the case of Eq. (11) above). Here, the density of the network
measures the variety in the network. In other words, if the same agents form pairs all the time,
or if production occurs mostly singly, network density is low. High network density occurs when
diﬀerent agents form pairs, which increases the number of links in the network. In this case, we see
that highest variety occurs when there is little relatedness among the products (which means that
agents change their partners frequently).
The second result that can be deduced from Figure 4 is the discontinuity observed when the
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Figure 4: Network Density
Here, it is possible to see that the network density is very low, which means that when the goods
are unrelated to each other, either there is single production (which will reduce network density),
or the same agents tend to form pairs all the time so that there is no variety in the network.13 In
other words, all agents will produce the goods that require most of their own expertise and if they
integrate their knowledge, they do so with agents of the same type.14 This discontinuity is also
observed in the remaining parts of the results below.
4.2 Geodesics
Figure 5 shows the shortest path between reachable and all nodes in the network. It conﬁrms the
reduced interaction among agents as goods become more related. It is also interesting to note that,
as relatedness rises, not only the geodesic between all pairs increase, but also the average geodesic
between only reachable pairs rise. As it is shown further below, this implies that clustering increases
(the case of totally isolated pairs being the extreme case) as goods become more related.
4.3 Clustering Coeﬃcient
Figure 6 shows that the clustering in the network increases signiﬁcantly as relatedness increases.
This is largely because when there is a high degree of relatedness among the goods, the same agents
interact, or agents produce singly. This reduces both the density of the network, and also increases
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Figure 7: Average Knowledge and Relatedness
4.4 Knowledge Dynamics
In Figure 7 we present the average knowledge levels with respect to relatedness. Despite high
variance, it is possible to see a slight fall in average knowledge level as relatedness increases. This
also implies that high networking (high density) also implies high average knowledge levels.
We also analysed the expertise levels, as Figure 8 shows, which we measured by the Blau index
[22] in the ﬁnal periods for each run. The weight of knowledge g in the total amount of knowledge









The extent to which an agent is a specialist (the extent to which the agent knows a certain knowledge







As Figure 8 reveals (showing the average of Expi taken over all agents for each run), expertise
level is highest when the products are completely unrelated (case Eq. (10) above). 15 However, it
is interesting to observe that when goods are even slightly related to each other, expertise levels are
signiﬁcantly lower, and increases thereof. Intuitively, this can be explained by the density pattern
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Figure 8: Expertise and Relatedness
high variety in the interaction patterns, i.e. diﬀerent agents form pairs). When this is the case,
agents learn in a wider range of knowledge types, and one of the reasons of variety in pairs is that
expertise types also change more frequently in the population (agents shift their expertise). The
average change of expertise is demonstrated in Figure 9. Whereas when relatedness is high, same
agents join for production so that the density is low. This implies that they learn in a limited
number of knowledge types. This increases expertise levels in the population.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
According to our results, the knowledge regime in the industry has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
structure and intensity of interactions. One of the results that both our simulations and analytical
model reveal is that collaboration takes place when there are gains from knowledge integration,
which depends on the structure of goods. In a two-producer, two-good economy, the more specialized
are the products (and thus the less related they are), the more important it becomes to have similar
expertise levels for each party to beneﬁt from collaboration, so that there are less possibilities for
collaboration when agents are too far apart in terms of their endowments. Contrarily, when there
are many producers, specialization of the goods results in intensive interactions among various
pairs since there are many partners to select from so that diﬀerent agents form pairs mostly (which
increases the density of the network). Therefore the restrictions of the two producer economy is not
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Figure 9: Frequency of Change in Expertise and Relatedness
which reduces expertise and results in a population in which knowledge is more distributed. When
this is the case, the ﬁelds that agents know most about also change frequently, which increases the
density of the network. Although weakly, we can also infer that knowledge levels tend to fall as
relatedness increases which might be because of lower density in the network. This lower density
also implies that clustering in the network increases, which is to say that the same agents form
pairs consistently, or single production prevails.
These results point to the importance of complementarities among products, and their implica-
tions for collaboration patterns. According to Mowery et. al. [11] there is an inverted-u relation
between cognitive distance among actors and gains from integration. They carry out an empirical
study to show that if the knowledge overlap is too high among ﬁrms, there is nothing to be gained.
If too distant, there is limited cognitive ability to understand. In this paper, we consider the struc-
ture of the goods explicitly, and explain how the distance between two goods in knowledge space is
mapped onto the interactions among agents who embody the knowledge the produce these goods.
We ﬁnd that when the goods are too similar, there is hardly any beneﬁts from collaboration. When
they are not related at all, there is also no beneﬁt form collaborating. Only when there is a low
degree of relatedness, so that a major input in one good is only minor in the others, do we see high
beneﬁts from integration of knowledge and high network density.
These results have direct bearing on the innovation policies. Innovation policies directed towards
deepening of the knowledge base (so that the products become more specialized in their composition
of certain inputs) increases the intensity of interactions, the average knowledge levels, and also it
18results in a more distributed knowledge among producers.
Obviously, there are many factors other than the knowledge base that inﬂuence networks as
a growing literature reveals, ranging from institutional factors, stage in the industry life cycle,
demand side eﬀects, cost considerations, ﬁrm strategies and many more. Nevertheless, in a world in
which knowledge is in the core of both business and academia, and in which networks are the main
mechanism through which knowledge diﬀuses, the impact of knowledge bases on network structure
deserves a central role.
19Notes
1Speciﬁcally, the choice faced by producer 1 can be expressed as, max(y1
1,y1






















12 and since k11 >k 12 from our assumption above, producer 1 produces good 1. Analogously,
when alone, producer 2 produces good 2.
2Here we assume that once producers decide to collaborate, then they contribute with all their endowment, in
other words they reveal all their knowledge in the production.
3We make the 50% split rule based on the following intuition. If the knowledge levels among the two producers
are too diﬀerent (if one of them is much more knowledgeable than the other), than collaboration will not take place
in any case, as we demonstrate below. Therefore, the two producers should be suﬃciently close to each other in their
relative expertise areas if they are to collaborate. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they share production
output equally. This rule also takes into account the fact that the relative price levels are unity.
4It follows directly from Proposition 1 that, when initial major knowledge levels are the same for both producers
(k11 = k22), collaboration will take place in the ﬁrst period if and only if k22 >k 21 and k22 >k 21. Therefore, if the
initial knowledge levels in the major knowledge types are the same, then there will always be collaboration, since by
our assumption above producer 1 is an expert in area 1 (k11 >k 12) a n dp r o d u c e r2i sa ne x p e r ti na r e a2( k22 >k 21).
5The knowledge setting used here is ﬁrst introduced by Cowan et. al [20]. Speciﬁcally, kij = khj means that
agents i and h have exactly the same knowledge in type j.I fkij >k hj agent i knows everything that agent h knows
in type j, and has some knowledge in addition.
6If product n uses 90% of knowledge type j, then there is 0.9 probability that agent i produces good n.
7In Table 1, we do not use double subscripts for purposes of clarity, since the elements of the matrix represent
t h es a m en u m e r i c a lv a l u e s .
8To see why this is so, see Table 1. For example, between products 1 and 2, here are two common knowledge
types, namely k1 and k2 so that the relatedness among them is higher than products 1 and 3 w h e r et h e yh a v eo n l y
k2 in common.
9As an example, in the case where γ2 =0 .99 and γ1 = γ3 =0 .005, even though there is a certain relatedness
between two consecutive goods it is suﬃciently small, since only 0.5 percent of a particular knowledge type is shared
between them.
10Diﬀerent paramater ranges were tried to test for the robustness of the results. The results do not change
signiﬁcantly, except that higher values of uncertainty parameter has the eﬀect of increasing the absolute levels of
network density.
11In the rest of the paper, software UCINET is used for give network measures (Borgatti et. al., [21]).
12The matrices upon which the density measures are based on is derived from the frequency matrices. When there
is a link between two agents, the value is set to 1, otherwise 0. Therefore, an edge between two agents mean that
they have formed a pair at least once in 500±10 periods.We use the frequency values in the analysis below.
13In this case, producing singly is higher than other cases.
14Integrating knowledge with another agent of the same type will require that one agent knows one minor type
better and the other agent knows the other minor type better so that there is still motivation for integration of
knowledge.
15Because the expertise index is extremely large in this case, it is not shown in Figure 8.
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Proposition 1
Proof. To be able to ﬁnd this we need to look at the indiﬀerence function for both producers,
which shows the critical production levels at which the producers are indiﬀerent between producing
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The interpretation of the equation is straightforward, which represents the trade-oﬀ faced by pro-
ducer 1. The LHS shows the net gain in producing good 1 as a pair. This is equal to producing
good 1 as a pair, less the opportunity cost which is producing good 1 singleton. The RHS shows, on
other hand, the net loss from producing as a pair. This is equivalent to what producer 1 could have
produced singleton, less the additional good 2 he gets by collaborating. If the RHS of equation 12









































Proof. In this case the new knowledge levels are
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these into the condition stated by Proposition 1 and rearranging terms we get
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